Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures by Sprenger, Jan & Stegenga, Jacob
	1	
Three Arguments for Absolute Outcome Measures 
Jan Sprenger and Jacob Stegenga1*2¶ 
 
Abstract 
Data from medical research is typically summarized with various types of outcome 
measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome 
measures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the 
reference class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second 
argument is decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for 
making a decision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interpreted as 
measures of causal strength, absolute measures satisfy a set of desirable properties, but 
relative measures don't. Absolute outcome measures outperform relative measures on all 
counts.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Clinical trials are performed in order to assess whether or not an experimental 
intervention is effective, and if so, to what degree. To make these inferences, data from 
clinical trials must be quantitatively summarized and analyzed in particular ways. Similar 
questions arise in epidemiology for assessing the degree to which exposure to a risk 
changes the probability of developing a disease.  
 
Several classes of such quantitative methods of analysis are available to medical 
researchers, including ‘relative’ outcome measures and ‘absolute’ outcome measures (we 
precisely define prominent examples of these measures in §2). Relative outcome measures 
are the most widely employed class of outcome measures. Here we offer three distinct 
arguments that absolute outcome measures are superior to relative outcome measures.  
  
Relative measures are widely used in clinical science—our three arguments entail that 
this widespread practice is epistemologically corrupt. The first argument for the 																																																								
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superiority of absolute measures is from cognitive bias: the use of relative measures 
promotes a reasoning fallacy and often leads to overestimation of intervention 
effectiveness, but absolute measures do not have this property (§3, see also Stegenga 
2015). Relative measures are erroneously taken to indicate risk reduction in the 
population as a whole. We then prove, in §4, that absolute outcome measures are 
sufficient (given the costs and utilities associated with the interventions) for making a 
rational choice between interventions. By contrast, relative outcome measures are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for choosing between two interventions. Thus, from a decision-
theoretic perspective, the widespread use of relative outcome measures is misguided. In §5 we 
present our third argument, the causal strength argument, in which we develop principled 
desiderata for probabilistic measures of causal strength and argue that absolute measures 
are superior to relative measures with respect to these desiderata. All three arguments 
employ particular absolute outcome measures (absolute risk reduction and number 
needed to treat) and relative outcome measures (relative risk and relative risk reduction) 
as exemplars. We conclude that medical science should more consistently use and report 
absolute outcome measures. 
 
 
2. Outcome Measures in Medical Research 
 
Clinical trials often measure outcomes in binary terms, such as the (non-)occurrence of a 
heart attack in a certain time period. Many prominent outcome measures apply to binary 
events: the odds ratio, relative risk (or risk ratio), relative risk reduction, absolute risk 
reduction (or risk difference), and number needed to treat. These measures can be 
defined by constructing a two-by-two table: suppose a trial has one group (E) composed of 
subjects who receive the experimental intervention, and a control group (C) composed of 
subjects who receive a different intervention (e.g., another intervention, a placebo or no 
treatment at all). Suppose further that the binary outcome is measured as present (Y) or 
absent (~Y), and the number of subjects with each outcome in each group is represented 
by letters (a-d), as follows: 
 
TABLE 1    
Group/Outcome Outcome Present (Y) Outcome Absent (~Y) Total Number in Group 
Experimental 
Intervention (E) 
a b a+b 
Control (C) c d c+d 
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Then the most prominent outcome measures can be defined as follows. 
  
Relative risk (RR): 
 RR = [a/(a+b)] / [c/(c+d)] 
Relative risk reduction (RRR): 
 RRR = [[a/(a+b)] – [c/(c+d)]] / [c/(c+d)] 
Absolute risk reduction (ARR): 
 ARR = a/(a+b) – c/(c+d) 
Number needed to treat (NNT): 
 NNT = 1 / [[a/(a+b)] – [c/(c+d)]] 
 
Observe that all these measures are defined in terms of the observed relative frequencies 
a/(a+b) and c/(c+d).3 It is convenient to write the outcome measures as a function of 
conditional probabilities which represent these frequencies. The probability of a subject 
having a Y outcome given that the subject is in group E, P(Y|E), is a/(a+b), and likewise, 
the probability of having a Y outcome given that the subject is in group C, P(Y|C), is 
c/(c+d).4 Thus we can define relative risk, relative risk reduction, absolute risk reduction, 
and number needed to treat as: 
 
 RR = P(Y|E)/P(Y|C) 
 RRR = [P(Y|E) – P(Y|C)] / P(Y|C) = RR – 1  
 ARR = P(Y|E) – P(Y|C) 
 NNT = 1/[P(Y|E) – P(Y|C)] = 1/ARR 
 
Thus RR and RRR are interchangeable and just differ in their scaling properties. Same 
with ARR and NNT. An intuitive interpretation of RR is the ratio of the frequency of 
recovery (or risk) in the treatment and the control group. RRR, by contrast, can be 
interpreted as a measure of causal attribution. For instance, let P(Y|C)—the probability 
of dying without taking a particular drug—be 4% and let P(Y|E)—the probability of 
dying after taking the drug—be 1%. Then RRR is equal to 75%: this is the proportion of 
deaths in the control group that vanish in the treatment group. For this reason, RRR is a 
																																																								
3  Another prominent outcome measure is the odds ratio OR = (a/b)/(c/d). This is the same as the 
ratio of the relative risk (RR) for Y and for ~Y. OR is often proposed as an alternative to RR and RRR 
(e.g., Nurminen 1995), especially for case-control studies, and it belongs to the class of relative measures. 
Also note that ARR is sometimes called ‘risk difference’.  
4  These probabilities are calculated from observed actual frequencies, and we switch freely between 
both notations. However, they can also be interpreted as estimates of limiting relative frequencies, causal 
propensities or subjective degree of beliefs. Our paper does not take a stand on this question.  
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particularly popular outcome measure in clinical science and epidemiology (e.g., Walter 
1976; Northridge 1995).  
 
The probabilistic notation of outcome measures abstracts away from the sample size of a 
clinical trial. Here is an example. A large randomized controlled trial called the Heart 
Protection Study was performed to test the capacity of a cholesterol-lowering drug to 
mitigate heart attacks and death among men with heart disease (HPSCG 2002). Over 
20000 middle-aged and elderly men who had heart disease or were at high risk for heart 
disease were recruited to the study, and half were randomly allocated to receive 
simvastatin (the cholesterol-lowering drug) and half to receive placebo, for five years. 
After these five years, death from all causes was 12.9% in the simvastatin group and 
14.7% in the placebo group, for an ARR of 1.8% and an RRR of 12.2%.5 Notably, 
although the event rates for the study groups were reported in the abstract, the only 
outcome measures reported were relative measures. 
 
This neglect of absolute outcome measures is a common practice in clinical research. A 
survey by King, Harper, and Young (2012) took a large a sample of articles published in 
medical and epidemiology journals and found that 75% reported only relative measures. 
This is encouraged by numerous proclamations to prefer relative outcome  measures over 
alternatives, such as editorials in influential journals such as the British Medical Journal: 
“Authors and journal editors should ensure that the results of trials and systematic reviews 
are reported as relative risks unless there is a convincing argument otherwise.” (Deeks 
1998)  
 
In what follows we challenge this practice by providing three different arguments for the 
superiority of absolute measures over relative measures. 
 
 
3. The Argument from Cognitive Bias 
 
The framing of a medical risk often affects the conclusions which are drawn. Physicians 
and patients overestimate the effectiveness of medical interventions when presented with 
only relative measures (see also Stegenga 2015). This systematic overestimation occurs 
because the employment of relative measures, such as RR or RRR, promotes the reference 
class fallacy, which we will explain below.  																																																								
5  Strictly speaking, both ARR and RRR deliver negative values, but we follow the convention in 
much of the medical literature to only report absolute values and to suppress the sign. 
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For starters, relative and absolute outcome measures can appear very different when the 
control event rate (i.e., P(Y|C)) is low. Consider the example of the Helsinki Heart Study, 
which tested the capacity of a drug (gemfibrozil) to decrease cardiac disease and death 
(Frick et al. 1987). After five years of taking the drug, the subjects in the experimental 
group had a reduced relative risk of cardiac disease of 34% (RRR). Due to the low base 
probability of cardiac disease, this amounted to an absolute risk reduction of 1.4% (ARR). 
These are different orders of magnitude.  
 
It is a robust empirical finding that physicians are more likely to  prescribe a drug when 
the risk is expressed in relative than in absolute terms  (Forrow, Taylor, and Arnold 1992; 
Bobbio, Demichelis, and Giustetto 1994; Nexøe et al. 2002). In an experiment by Bobbio 
et al., which drew on data from the Helsinki Heart Study, physicians had to choose 
between various drugs on the basis of reported outcome measures. The effect of drug A 
was quantified with a relative outcome measure (RRR=34%) and the effect of drug B was 
quantified with an absolute outcome measure (ARR=1.4%). Physicians were much more 
likely to prescribe drug A than drug B, though both outcome measures were 
quantifications of the same data about the same drug. Patients show a similar pattern 
when asked for their acceptance of a medical treatment  (Malenka et al. 1993; Hux and 
Naylor 1995; Sorensen et al. 2008).  
 
This behavior represents a substantive overestimation of treatment effects. In many cases 
of common preventive care (e.g., lowering blood pressure or cholesterol levels), the rates 
of the risk (e.g., a cardiac event) are low in both the treatment and the control group. The 
above levels of RRR and ARRs correspond to a control event rate of P(Y|C) = 4.1% and 
a treatment event rate of P(Y|E) = 2.7%. The relative outcome measure RRR = 34% 
suggests a strong effect when actually the treatment only helps a small number of patients 
exposed to the risk (1.4% of patients, to be precise).  
 
Overestimation of intervention effectiveness is due to the reference class fallacy. That is, the 
sentence “a 34% cardiac event reduction was demonstrated” is taken to imply that 34% 
of all patients benefit from the treatment when in reality this number only refers to a 
small subset of that population: the patients in the control group that develop Y. The 
reference class fallacy explains why framing risk in relative terms leads to more optimistic 
estimates of effectiveness.  
 
However, do physicians and patients really commit a fallacy? In the above study by 
Bobbio et al., the control event rate P(Y|C) was not revealed to the participants. But 
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without such information, one cannot meaningfully compare the values of ARR and 
RRR and realize that they have been computed from the same dataset. Therefore one 
cannot infer that participants in the above study are committing a proper reasoning 
fallacy.  
 
This objection is sound, but unfortunately, experiments reveal that cognitive bias persists 
in the face of full information. Malenka et al. (1993) observed that patients are, for the 
most part, unable to translate relative outcome measures into absolute outcome measures 
even if the control event rate is known. In their experiment, participants were presented 
with a control event rate P(Y|C) = 50% (the risk of dying in the next year without 
treatment) and a medication that would decrease this risk by 50%. Only 28.2% of the 
participants of the study drew the correct conclusion that this medication would prevent 
25 deaths if 100 people were treated; 47.7% of participants claimed that 50 deaths would 
be prevented. Most other participants said they did not know the answer.  
 
This experiment reveals that we are dealing with a proper reasoning fallacy, and that this 
fallacy is due to a misidentification of the relevant reference class. Hence, inferring 
effectiveness of a medical treatment based on relative outcome measures is indeed prone 
to cognitive bias. Since relative outcome measures trigger cognitive biases in both 
physicians and patients, such measures should be avoided. We will now argue that 
absolute outcome measures are excellent alternatives.  
 
 
4. The Decision-Theoretic Argument  
 
Some commentators have suggested that the absolute risk reduction measure is superior 
to relative measures in a decision context. This view is occasionally expressed in the 
clinical literature and sometimes by philosophers, such as Worrall 2010 and Stegenga 
2015. Here we prove that this is the case.  
 
Let A mean that a patient consumes treatment A; let B mean that the patient consumes 
treatment B (this could be a competitor intervention, or placebo, or nothing at all); let a 
be the cost of consuming A (where cost is construed broadly, to include all harmful effects 
of A); let b be the cost of consuming B (again construed broadly). Let Y mean that the 
outcome of interest occurs (e.g., recovery); finally, let the utility of Y be u and the utility of 
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~Y be u’.6 The expected utility of consuming A is EU[A] and the expected utility of 
consuming B is EU[B].  
 
The principle of maximizing expected utility holds that a patient should consume A 
rather than B if and only if the expected utility of consuming A is greater than that of 
consuming B. The corresponding decision rule is: 
 
(#) For any u, u’, a, and b (without loss of generality: a > b and u > u’), 
consume A rather than B if and only if EU[A] > EU[B].  
 
An outcome measure is EU-sufficient if and only if the outcome measure is sufficient to 
compare EU[A] and EU[B], for given a, b, u, and u’. An outcome measure is EU-
insufficient if and only if it is not EU-sufficient (that is, if and only if the outcome measure is 
insufficient to compare EU[A] and EU[B], for given a, b, u, and u’). If an outcome 
measure is EU-sufficient then there is a strong pro tanto reason for requiring its use in 
measuring the effectiveness of medical interventions, and conversely, if an outcome 
measure is EU-insufficient then there is a strong pro tanto reason against its use in 
measuring the effectiveness of medical interventions. We now prove that ARR and NNT 
are EU-sufficient and RR and RRR are EU-insufficient.7 
 
4.1. ARR and NNT are EU-sufficient 
 
With the above approach, we can calculate the expected utility of treatment A and B as  
 
 EU[A] = P(Y|A)u + P(~Y|A)u’ – a 
  = P(Y|A)u  + [1 – P(Y|A)]u’ – a 
      = P(Y|A)(u – u’) + u’ – a 
 
 EU[B]  = P(Y|B)u  + [1 – P(Y|B)]u’ – b 
       = P(Y|B)(u – u’) + u’ – b 
 
The expected utility of consuming A rather than consuming B is: 
 EU[A] – EU[B] = P(Y|A)(u – u’)  + u’ – a – [P(Y|B) (u – u’) + u’ – b] 																																																								
6  These a's and b's, which denote the costs of a treatment, should not be conflated with those from 
the introduction.  
7  In our derivation, we estimate the probability of an occurrence of Y in the A and B by the 
observed relative frequencies (see Table 1). This is a significant idealization, but it does not affect the 
argument that follows. For discussion, see Stegenga 2015. 
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           = [P(Y|A) – P(Y|B)](u – u’) – (a – b) 
Note that ARR appears as the leftmost multiplicand in this term.  
 
Thus,  
 EU[A] – EU[B] > 0 iff [P(Y|A) – P(Y|B)] (u – u’) - (a - b) > 0 
which is equivalent to  
 EU[A] > EU[B] iff [P(Y|A) – P(Y|B)] > (a – b)/(u – u’) 
 
Note that ARR appears on the left side of this inequality, and the right side of the 
inequality is fully determined by a, b, u, and u’. So, if given a, b, u, u’, and ARR, one can 
determine whether EU[A] > EU[B]. Thus ARR is EU-sufficient and one should 
consume A if and only if ARR > (a-b)/(u-u'). The same result holds for NNT which is just 
the inverse of ARR:  
 
 EU[A] > EU[B] iff 1/NNT > (a – b)/(u – u’) 
 
4.2. RR and RRR are EU-insufficient 
 
Assume without loss of generality that RR > 1. Above we showed that  
 EU[A] > EU[B] iff [P(Y|A) – P(Y|B)] > (a – b)/(u – u’) 
Note that  
 P(Y|A) – P(Y|B) = P(Y|B)[P(Y|A)/P(Y|B) – 1] 
which is equivalent to  
 P(Y|A) – P(Y|B) = P(Y|B)(RR – 1) 
and so  
 EU[A] > EU[B] iff P(Y|B)(RR – 1) > (a – b)/(u – u’) 
which is, given RR > 1, equivalent to  
 EU[A] > EU[B] iff P(Y|B) > (a – b)/[(u – u’)(RR – 1)]  (^) 
 
Thus (#) holds that one should consume A rather than B if and only if P(Y|B) > (a – b)/(u 
– u’)(RR – 1). Note that a given RR does not constrain the values that P(Y|B) can take in 
the interval [0,1], and neither do the values of a, b, u, or u’. So, for any particular value of 
RR we consider two cases: 
 
(i) P(Y|B) = (a – b)/[(u – u’)(RR – 1)] – ε 
(ii) P(Y|B) = (a – b)/[(u – u’)(RR – 1)] + ε 
 
for some ε which is suitably small such that P(Y|B) remains bounded between 0 and 1. 
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Now consider both cases separately: 
 
Case (i):  P(Y|B) < (a – b)/[(u – u’)(RR – 1)] and thus EU[A] < EU[B]. 
Case (ii): P(Y|B) > (a – b)/[(u – u’)(RR – 1)] and thus EU[A] > EU[B]. 
 
So, if given a, b, u, u’, and RR, one cannot determine if EU[A] > EU[B]. Thus RR is 
EU-insufficient, which means that decisions based on RR may not have maximal 
expected utility, depending on the values of P(Y|B). The same result can be shown for 
RRR = RR – 1. We simply rewrite (^) as  
 
EU[A] > EU[B] iff P(Y|B) > (a – b)/[(u – u’) * RRR] 
 
Again, for any particular RRR, we can consider two cases: 
 
(i) P(Y|B) = [(a – b)/[(u – u’) * RRR] – ε 
(ii) P(Y|B) = [(a – b)/[(u – u’) * RRR] + ε 
 
for some ε which is suitably small such that P(Y|B) remains bounded between 0 and 1. 
Now consider both cases separately: 
 
Case (i):  P(Y|B) < (a – b)/[(u – u’) * RRR] and thus EU[A] < EU[B]. 
Case (ii): P(Y|B) > (a – b)/[(u – u’) * RRR] and thus EU[A] > EU[B]. 
 
Thus, RRR cannot determine alone, given a, b, u and u', whether A has a higher 
expected utility than B. This concludes the proof of the EU-insufficiency of RR and 
RRR.8 On the other hand, decisions based on ARR and NNT will always pick the 
intervention with the higher expected utility.  
 
Hence, relative outcome measures may be useful for attributing outcomes to causal 
factors, but they are not suitable for making choices that are supposed to maximize the 
expected utility of a future patient. This demonstrates once more the special status of 
absolute outcome measures such as ARR and NNT. In practice, a, b, u and u' may be 
unknown or a matter of contention, but it is important that we are in principle able to 
base a rational decision on the value of an outcome measure.  
 																																																								
8   EU-insufficiency can also be demonstrated for another relative outcome measure, the odds ratio 
OR (proof omitted, see footnote 1 for a definition).  
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5.  The Causal Strength Argument 
 
The various outcome measures can also be regarded as a quantification of statistical effect 
size or as measures of the causal strength of the link between a treatment and an effect. 
Indeed, the literature on probabilistic causation often quantifies the strength of a causal 
link by comparing two conditional probabilities: the probability of an effect given the 
putative cause, P(Y|E), and the probability of the same effect given the absence of the 
cause, P(Y|C) (Suppes 1970; Cartwright 1979; Eells 1991; Fitelson and Hitchcock 2011). 
We can interpret outcome measures in medicine as measures of the causal strength 
between treatment and recovery. After all, medical trials try to answer questions about 
the causal effectiveness of interventions.  
 
Our argument in this section draws on two observations: (1) ARR, NNT and derived 
absolute outcome measures combine assessments of causal strength in an intuitive way; (2) 
RR, RRR and derived relative measures misrepresent the causal strength of an 
intervention for a conjunction of unrelated effects. For a detailed axiomatic investigation 
of probabilistic causal strength measures for binary outcomes, see Sprenger (2017).  
 
The first observation deals with combining assessments of causal strength along a single 
path. In causal inference, we often have to deal with mediators: variables which transfer an 
effect from an intervention to an observed effect. For instance, frequent exercise (E) has 
an effect on the occurrence of cardiovascular diseases (D) via various intermediate 
properties that such as one’s blood pressure (B). (Assume for the sake of simplicity that this 
is the only link between exercise and cardiovascular diseases.) See Figure 1 below.  
 
FIGURE 1. The causal relationship between three variables represented as a directed 
acyclical graph.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, it is often desirable to combine assessments of causal strength along a causal graph 
such as the one in Figure 1 in a natural manner. That is, the strength of the two causal 
links between exercise and blood pressure, and between blood pressure and 
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cardiovascular diseases, should be sufficient to determine the overall causal strength of the 
relationship between exercise and cardiovascular diseases. In other words, there is a 
function f such that for any measure c of causal strength: c(E, D) = f(c(E, B), c(B, D)). One 
may also demand that c(E, D) ≤ c(E, B) and  c(E, D) ≤ c(B, D): the presence of 
intermediate variables does not increase causal strength. A natural function that satisfies 
this requirement and several other ones on combining causal strength is ARR(E, D) = 
P(D|E) – P(D|~E). (See also Good 1961.) In fact, ARR(E, D) = ARR(E, B) * ARR(B, D), 
which allows for a particularly simple calculation of overall causal strength as a function 
of the strength of individual links. Similarly, NNT(E, D) = NNT(E, B) * NNT(B, D).9 
Other measures, such as RR and RRR, do not have this property: for these measures, the 
overall causal strength is not a function of the measures of the individual causal links. One 
can demonstrate that derivatives of ARR are the only measures of causal strength that 
satisfy this property together with the relatively uncontroversial constraint that causal 
strength is a function on P(Y|E) and P(Y|C) where E and C denote an experimental 
intervention and a control intervention, respectively (Theorem 3, Sprenger 2017). 
 
The second observation deals with composite effects. Imagine that an intervention E (e.g., 
blood pressure lowering medication) has a certain effect on the occurrence of a binary 
event Y (e.g., a heart attack). Now suppose that we want to quantify the effect of E on the 
conjunction of Y and an event Z that is independent of both E and Y (e.g., frequent 
migraine attacks). Although E does nothing to reduce the risk of Z, the causal effect of E 
on Y&Z is as great as the causal effect of E for Y, according to RR and RRR. It can be 
shown that RR, RRR and their derivatives are the only outcome measures to have this 
property (Theorem 4, Sprenger 2017).10 This property is likely to mislead physicians and 
patients because a nonexistent causal relationship is suggested. It also opens the door to 
																																																								
9  Proof for ARR:  ARR(E, D) = P(D|E) - P(D|~E)  = P(D|BE) P(B|E) + P(D|~BE) P(~B|E) - 
P(D|B~E) P(B|~E) - P(D|~B~E) P(~B|~E) [by the law of total probability]  
 = P(D|B) P(B|E) + P(D|~B) P(~B|E) - P(D|B) P(B|~E) - P(D|~B) P(~B|~E)   [by the 
causal structure of the graph] 
 = P(D|B) [P(B|E) - P(B|~E)] + P(D|~B) [P(~B|E) - P(~B|~E)]   
 = P(D|B) [P(B|E) - P(B|~E)] - P(D|~B) [P(B|E) - P(B|~E)] 
 = [P(D|B) - P(D|~B)] * [P(B|E) - P(B|~E)] 
 = ARR(B, D) * ARR(E, B) 
 The analogous result for NNT follows easily from the equality NNT = 1/ARR:  
 NNT(E, D) = 1/ARR(E, D) = 1/(ARR(B, D) * ARR(E, B)) = NNT(B, D) * NNT (E, D). 
 
10  Proof for RR: Suppose that Z is an effect which is independent of the intervention E. Suppose also 
that Y and Z are independent conditional on E. Then P(YZ|E) = P(Y|E) * p(Z|E) = P(Y|E) * p(Z). The 
same holds for C=~E: P(YZ|C) = P(Y|C) * P(Z|C) = P(Y|C) * p(Z). Hence RR(E,YZ) = P(Y|E)/P(Y|C) 
= RR(E,Y). Since RRR = RR – 1, the same results holds for RRR, too.  
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the manipulation of the presentation of trial outcomes. Therefore ARR and NTT should 
be preferred to RR, RRR and other relative outcome measures.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
We have argued for the superiority of absolute over relative outcome measures. 
Unfortunately, relative measures are widely employed in clinical research and absolute 
measures are underutilized. Our arguments show this to be mistaken and call for a 
change of this practice. Some clinical scientists, statisticians, and philosophers have 
claimed that absolute measures are superior to relative measures, and in this paper we 
provide a principled justification for this view.  
 
We have made a cumulative case for this conclusion. The argument from cognitive bias 
contends that using the absolute risk reduction ARR instead of the relative risk reduction 
RRR or other relative outcome measures decreases the chance of overestimating 
treatment effects and committing the reference class fallacy. The decision-theoretic 
argument demonstrates that absolute measures are necessary and sufficient (when given 
pertinent costs and utilities) to choose between intervention options according to dictates 
of decision theory, while relative measures are insufficient in this regard. Finally, the 
causal strength argument shows that ARR also possesses a natural interpretation as a 
measure of causal strength between an intervention and an observed result, and that it 
has several properties that distinguish it as such a measure. By contrast, relative outcome 
measures fail to combine causal strength assessments satisfactorily, and they fail to detect 
when interventions only affect one instead of several outcomes of interest.  
 
While each single argument may be sufficient to establish the superiority of ARR and its 
derivatives over relative measures, we consider the cumulative case to be particularly 
compelling. Medical science, whether in clinical trials or in epidemiology, should always 
use and report absolute outcome measures.  
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